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1.  Introduction
The way in which a problem is described influences  approaches  to  its
solution.  If the problem is  large and complex, like  agricultural trade
policy, the act of description is  non-trivial.  A. K. Sen  (1980) has
argued that any analytical  description involves choice.  From a variety of
aspects of a problem the  analyst must choose those  that most clearly
reflect its nature.  Description is  of particular relevance when a
synthesis is  attempted of a problem traditionally approached from
different disciplines.
Liberalizing agricultural trade  is  at once an economic, political,
and legal  problem.  Economists  emphasize efficiency gains  and losses  from
trade;  political scientists examine the  interest group pressures  and power
structures  affecting trade regimes;  legal analysts  focus  on rules of
obligation and liability in trade agreements.  This paper  attempts a
partial synthesis of these perspectives by describing international
agricultural  trade as  a "public good problem."  Public goods  are shared by
a group without direct rivalry and without the exclusion of those whose
benefits are not matched by proportionate contributions  (Samuelson, 1954).
Public  goods  form an intersection of economic, political, and  legal
scholarship, because they involve incentives leading to  inefficiency, are
directly related to  interest group pressures,  and are affected by rules of
liability and obligation (see Olson, 1965).
Kindleberger  (1986) and Silk (1987) have recently argued that  the
international trading system itself is  such a good.  While not a "pure"
public good in the sense used by economists,  free  and open international
agricultural markets generate an economic  "surplus" which  is  shared by all3
market participants  (World  Bank, 1987).  These "gains  from trade"  are
public benefits  (ex ante)  even if their  distribution is  ultimately a
matter of rivalry.  While the benefits of free trade  are widely shared,
its costs tend to  fall more narrowly on those  groups that are
uncompetitive.  When countries retain the general benefits of open trade
while attempting to protect certain sectors from competition, they are
"free riding," drawing down the global benefits which trade provides.
Recent research on the provision of public goods,  to be examined below,
lends  insight into  the problem of opening agricultural trade  in the  face
of protectionist pressures.
Beginning with Adam Smith, political economists have debated whether
the public benefits of unrestricted trade are justified in light of the
private costs  it  imposes on groups that are uncompetitive without
protection.  These groups have demanded protection from the  shifting winds
of creative destruction affecting foreign trade.  The  famous English Corn
Law debates revolved around the same  issues which today grip world
agriculture.  Can protection be lowered in the  face of losses borne by
protected sectors such as  agriculture, or will  the protected interests
defeat such attempts?  These demands  for protection are often urgent and
well-focused.  Arguments for  free  trade often seem less urgent  and
unfocused, precisely because benefits are widely diffused.
In the  face of these pressures,  the post-war governments erected the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade  (GATT).  Since  1947, when the  GATT
was signed by the United States and 22  other countries,  it has  grown to
include 92  contracting parties and 31 de  facto members, accounting for 90
percent of  those engaged in trade.  The legal principles  on which it  is4
based are:  (1) nondiscrimination and reciprocity in trade;  (2) protection
through "transparent" measures, such as  tariffs,  rather than quotas;  (3)
binding tariff levels  fixed through negotiation;  and (4) notification,
consultation and arbitration in the  face of disputes  (see Catudal, 1961;
Aho and Aronson, 1985).  While these  legal obligations are principally
designed to  reduce backsliding toward protectionism, they have succeeded
in actually reducing levels  of protection over time.  In the manufacturing
sector,  they are credited with reducing tariffs from their original post-
war level above 40 percent down to  less  than 5 percent  today (Paarlberg,
1987).
Unfortunately, one of the most glaring exceptions to  these principles
is agriculture.  In addition to  general exceptions granted to  agriculture
under Articles XI and XVI,  the United States has demanded and received
special treatment under a 1955 waiver which allows  quantitative  import
restrictions on agricultural products  affected by price  supports.  These
exceptions have encouraged agriculture  to remain a highly protected
sector, contrary to  the basic GATT goal of trade  liberalization (see
Congressional Research Service,  1986;  Paarlberg,  1987;  Sanderson, 1986).
In September 1986,  at Punta del  Este, Uruguay, it was agreed to
reopen trade negotiations under GATT, and to consider agricultural
protection as a key priority in the  "Uruguay Round".  The purpose  of this
paper is  to describe the uncoming round of negotiations over agricultural
trade as  a problem of public goods  provision, utilizing a variety of
recent innovations  in economic and political theory to  gain insight  into
the problem of  trade policy reform.  This description, we hope, can5
contribute  to better understanding of the  difficulties confronting the
next GATT round.
2.  Gains  from Trade as a Public Good
In economic theory,  the most powerful argument for free  trade  is  its
efficiency.  Efficiency as used by economists means  that trade satisfies
the  demands  of more agents  at higher levels  than would occur  in  its
absence.  These are the  "gains from trade."  A fundamental theorem in
welfare economics holds  that in the absence  of constraints  on trade,  the
allocation of goods  in a competitive equilibrium is  "Pareto-efficient".
Pareto-efficiency is a state  in which no  agent can be made better off
without making at least one other agent worse off.  In principle, once
efficiency has been achieved, those disadvantaged by trade can be
compensated out of the resulting gains.  Unfortunately, the existence of
public goods  and other  "externalities" upsets the fundamental  theorems of
welfare economics, making efficiency and compensation difficult to
separate  in practice  (Stiglitz,  1985).
Critics  of free trade  and the relevance of Pareto-efficiency have
also emphasized that neither is  necessarily fair.  "Fair trade",  in
addition to being an appealing (though ambiguous) argument for equity, is
also a concern of some  theorists, who note that even a Pareto-efficient
allocation is  entirely compatible with one person (or country) getting
everything, and everyone else getting nothing (Sen, 1983).  In reality,
the  economic debate over agricultural trade  revolves around not only the
efficiency, but also the  fairness,  of various alternatives  (Rausser, 1982;
Runge and von Witzke, 1987).
Public  goods pose problems of both efficiency and fairness.  They are6
difficult to  supply efficiently because of the  "free rider" problem.
Their supply is  also related to  fairness,  since few are willing to
contribute more than a "fair share", based on some prior understanding
about what a fair contribution is  (see Marwell and Ames, 1979;  1980;
1981).  A free and open trading system is continually confronted by
countries that enjoy its benefits while overtly or surreptitiously
protecting certain sectors.  This form of free riding offends other
countries'  sense of fairness, leading to retaliation.  Both protection and
retaliation reduce the  gains from trade, leaving all countries worse off.
Indeed, it is  possible  to show that  the gains  from trade  can be completely
eroded by retaliatory distortions  in domestic agricultural policy (Schmitz
et al.,  1986).
Despite these  incentive  and equity problems, recent research points
to  the constructive role which obligations to  institutional rules  can play
in the efficient provision of public goods.  It  is  the relationship
between rules  and public goods  that makes  this research relevant to  the
impact of GATT on agricultural  trade liberalization.  The key feature of
such  rules  is  that they provide a structure of obligation and liability
that is both well-defined and perceived to be fair, making claims  of
benefit and cost more  secure.  This  security, or  assurance, can result in
successful collective  agreements leading to  public goods provision (Runge,
1984).
An important recent result consistent with this approach  (Sugden,
1984) proves  that public goods can be provided at Pareto-efficient  levels.
In Sugden's model, the propensity to  free  ride can be  overcome by a set of
reciprocal obligations  in which each member of a group contributes to  the7
public good, conditional  on the assurance  that others will do  the  same.
The result turns crucially on the resolution of this  "assurance problem"
(Sen, 1967).  As  Sugden emphasizes  (1984, p. 781),  a structure of
reciprocal obligation, encoded in institutional  rules of behavior, can
provide public goods  at a Pareto-efficient level  only if  the rules  act to
assure  the  group  that  its members are  contributing their "fair  shares".
This approach does not predict that the free  rider problem will be solved,
only that it can, depending on the  level of reciprocal obligation, and the
assurance that these obligations will be kept.  Without such assurance,
any group can be trapped in an equilibrium in which everyone would
contribute more  if only others would too, but in which no one will make
the first move.
The  international trading system is  in large part founded on a
similar form of assurance.  If countries fail  to  commit domestic  resources
to reduce protectionism,  and instead seek to free  ride by benefiting from
the trading system while protecting themselves from its  costs,  the
structure of reciprocity will unravel toward autarchy.  In order to hold
the  line against demands  for protection (especially domestic  demands  for
"fair trade"),  countries must be assured that other trading nations will
not  impose new barriers of their own.  This  structure of mutual obligation
is encoded  in the  first and most basic principle of the GATT:
nondiscrimination and reciprocity,  expressed in the Most-Favored Nation
(MFN) clause.
The purpose  of GATT as  an institution is  to  adjudicate and coordinate
the system of reciprocal  trading rules.  Like many other international
institutions, GATT is  relatively weak, because  countries are unwilling  to8
provide  international public goods by surrendering sovereignty to  an
international government or  single hegemonic power  (Kindleberger, 1986).
The role of  the U.S.  as  a hegemonic power after World War II,  which
allowed it  to  demand and receive  the  1955 waiver  to agriculture, has
eroded (Keohane, 1984).  In the absence  of hegemony, the  system depends
primarily on coordinating the collective actions  of the  trading nations as
a whole (Snidal,  1985).  Because it  is a glaring exception to  the  rules of
reciprocity embodied in the  treaty, the U.S. waiver and other forms of
agricultural protectionism are major contributors to  the  inefficiency and
perceived lack of fairness  in world trade.
This view of international agricultural trade has  implications for
both theory and policy.  In theory, wherever public goods  are present,
efficiency will not be achieved through atomistic competition alone.  Its
achievement will be bound up not only with fairness but with the problem
of acquiring information concerning the  likely behavior of others. 1 The
assurance problem arises because  of insufficient  information concerning
the willingness of others  to honor an agreement  to contribute  to  a public
good.  Theory must thus account explicitly for problems of information
acquisition and the strategic  structure of reciprocal  expectations.
At the  level of policy, the approach is  at variance with atomistic
pursuit of national or group self-interest.  The invisible hand guiding
1Much of the work in this  area has  concerned "principal-agent
problems".  In these cases,  the  "principal" has less  information  than
necessary to direct the behavior of the  "agents",  an asymmetry leading to
problems of efficient allocation.  In other problems,  the  informational
asymmetry takes  the  form of "adverse selection",  in which there  is
imperfect information concerning the characteristics of what is  being
bought or sold in the market, or  "moral hazard",  in which there  is
imperfect information concerning the  action which the  individual
undertakes  (see Stiglitz,  1985;  Runge and Myers, 1985).9
decisions  toward collectively rational outcomes  is  a palsied one without
explicit efforts at coordination provided by nonmarket institutions
(Stiglitz, 1985).  Where  international governance  is weak, and hegemonic
power by single  countries  is insufficient to provide order, efforts at
coordination and the  assurance  it brings will  rise  in importance  (Snidal,
1985).  This approach leads  to calls  for strengthening international
institutions  such as  the GATT.  It predicts that policies favoring
protectionist free  riding or unrealizable hegemony -- notably the GATT
exceptions  for agriculture  --  will reduce the level of obligation felt  to
the international trading system as  a whole.  The remainder of this paper
elaborates  this argument in the more  formal language of economic  and
political theory.
3.  Agricultural Trade as  a Coordination Problem
Any country's policies have some  effects on other countries.2
Macroeconomic policies of economic expansion or contraction in one
country, for example, may lead to  costs  for other countries.  Stimulative
monetary policy under flexible exchange  rates may cause  a country to
increase inflation in the hope of weakening its currency, leading to
reductions  in domestic unemployment at the expense  of increases in
domestic inflation.  But if  all  (or a sufficiently large) number of
countries pursue such a policy, none can succeed, because  exchange rates
cannot fall for everyone.  Overall, expansionary monetary policies then
2The fundamental  insight of modern economics is  that market trading
leads  to positive effects that are greater than in the absence  of such
trade.  This gain from trade  is  a "pecuniary externality"  (Scitovsky,
1954) which,  if widely shared, is  a form of public good.  When large
numbers of agents  share  a positive externality, it  is a public good
(Mishan, 1971, pp. 9-13).10
result in much higher inflation than expected, due  to a failure to
anticipate  that other countries will follow suit.  Instead of  increasing
export trade through a lower exchange rate,  such policies  may only  "export
inflation"  (Hamada, 1976).
In agriculture, U.S. attempts  to raise price  supports, expand
exported output and increase farm income  in the  1970's have led to  similar
problems due to a failure  to account for  the strategic  interdependence of
U.S. policies and those  of other trading nations.  Many other agricultural
exporters also pursued policies of price  supports and expanded output,
contributing to ever-increasing world production and decreasing world
prices.  The  consequence is  that governments' agricultural policies have
led to higher and higher budget expenditures  to protect agricultural
incomes, substantially increasing farm program costs.
In the  cases of both exchange rates  and agricultural price supports,
there are generally coordinated solutions that would leave all countries
better off.  However, such coordination generally means  that existing
institutions  must be modified or a new institutional framework invented,
so that countries are assured that their actions will be coordinated to
mutual advantage.3 In the GATT case,  the primary change in the
institutional  arrangement contemplated in the upcoming round of
negotiations in greater inclusion of agriculture under GATT  rules.
However, a wide variety of other forms of agricultural policy coordination
3Kehoe  (1986a, b) demonstrates  in a dynamic optimal taxation model
that fiscal policy coordination may be inoptimal due  to  a lack of binding
commitments by government not  to  tax capital  too highly.  Interestingly,
the  problem is a lack of assurance by consumers that taxes on capital will
not be raised once an agreement between countries has been struck.  This
assurance problem is what prevents  coordination from being a superior
solution.  What is  lacking is an institution to maintain this assurance.11
are possible, both inside and outside  the GATT  (see Paarlberg, 1987;
Schmitz, et al.,  1981).  In this paper, we shall  focus on the GATT,  and
the prospect for bringing agriculture  into line with other sectors under
the GATT Treaty.  We  regard GATT as a necessary, though not a sufficient,
basis for agricultural policy reform  (see Paarlberg, 1987).
This problem of international institutional innovation may be
approached from the perspective  of game theory.  Artis and Ostry  (1986),
following Hamada  (1976),  compare  three game-theoretic solutions  to  the
problem of policy coordination.  These solutions are Nash, Stackelberg,
and cooperative  equilibria.  Nash equilibrium results when each country
optimizes by acting individually, accepting other countries' policy as
given.  Stackelberg equilibrium results when one country, such as  Canada,
emerges as  a leader, and other countries follow in a Nash fashion, with
the leader alone  optimizing individually (e.g.,  McCalla, 1966).
Cooperation, the  third solution concept, yields  a range of equalibria.
A simple coordination problem for two countries, each with trade
strategies 0 and 1, is  shown below in normal form.
Country B
0  1
0  (4, 3)  (2, 2)
Country A
1  (1, 1)  (3,  4)12
Trade  strategies coordinated along the diagonal  lead to outcomes that  are
Pareto-Optimal (Sen, 1969).  Despite the optimality of the solutions  in
which trade policy coordination occurs, one cooperative  solution (0, 0) is
better for Country A, and one  (1,  1) is  better for country B, illustrating
the  distinction between Pareto-Optimality and distribution.4 However,
both equilibria are better than the off-diagnonal,  uncoordinated
strategies.  Note  that policy coordination does not necessarily imply that
countries A and B pursue the  same policy, only that  their trade strategies
are coordinated with each other.
As  Snidal notes  in discussing this  game  (1985, pp.  931-934),  the
problem is  that neither country can choose its best policy without some
assurance concerning what the other intends  to  do.  Easy resolution is
hindered by the inherently opposed country interests over where
coordination should occur.  Unlike the more familiar prisoners'  dilemma
(PD) game, the problem in this case  is  one  of a choice over multiple
stable  equilibria.  In the PD the problem  is  to  avoid a single stable but
Pareto-inferior equilibrium. 5 It  is  also important to emphasize that
4Schelling (1960) describes such a problem in terms of Holmes and
Moriarty, each aboard separate trains, neither in touch with one another,
attempting to coordinate  the point at which they might detrain.  Both
benefit from getting off at the same  station, with Holmes benefitting most
if  they detrain together  at (0, 0) and Moriarty benefitting most if they
detrain together at  (1, 1).
5If CA represents  the  strategy of country A and CB  that of country B,
for two strategies 0 and 1, the prisoners' dilemma ordering is:
CA (0, 1) > CA (1, 1) > CA  (0, 0) > CA (1, 0)
CB  (1,  0) > CB  (1, 1) > CB  (0, 0) > CB  (0, 1)
The equilibrium (0, 0) is  a single, stable, and Pareto-inferior
equilbrium.  In contrast,  the assurance problem takes  the general form:
CA (0,  0) > CA (1, 1) > CA (0, 1) - CA (1, 0)
CB  (1, 1) > CB  (0, 0) > CB  (1, 0) - CB  (0, 1)
Here there  are multiple equilibria:  (0,  0) and (1, 1).  In the  special
form of this  game  in which there  is  an agreed best outcome, the ordering13
trade negotiations involve non-discrete choices  that are not  "all or
nothing",  and which are affected by considerations of both bargaining
power and fairness.  These and other complexities  are taken up below in
the discussion of the  GATT.
Figure 1 shows  the  comparative-static relationship between Nash,
Stackelberg and cooperative  equilibria  (see Artis and Ostry, pp.  12-20).
Countries A and B are assumed to have preferences  defined over
agricultural policy goals, notably the  level of protection of the
agricultural  sector.  Variables not dependent on agricultural policy are
taken as  given.  Agricultural policy goals  are direct functions  of the
agricultural policy instruments chosen by each country.  Each axis,  for
example, could represent levels  of domestic  agricultural price  support.
Assume that the  "bliss  point" of Country A, in terms of agricultural
income,  is given by A* and that of Country B by B*.  These points reflect
the  impact of price  supports on income.  Preferences are defined by
elliptical indifference curves which fall for A the further  they are  from
A*, and which fall  for B the  further  they are  from B*.  RA and RB are
reaction functions  for each country.  They plot  the policies of Country A
in response to  those of Country B, and vice versa, under the myopic
assumption that the other country's policy is  taken as  given.
Equilibria are labeled N (Nash),  S (Stackelberg) and C (cooperative).
Both the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria are  single points;  C is not a
takes  the form:
CA (1, 1) >  CA  (0, 0) >  CA (0, 1) >  CA (1, 0)
CB  (1, 1) >  CB  (0, 0) >  CB  (1, 0) >  CB (0, 1)
While retaining the  set of multiple equilibria, the problem is now not one
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single point, but the  locus of tangencies  between the preference curves  of
the  two countries.  The Nash equilibrium is  at the  interesection of RA and
RB,  since  each reaction function describes  the myopic optimization of the
countries acting individually.  The Stackelberg  equilibrium shows  Country
A as  the  leader:  A is not myopic, but determines  its own policies so  as
to  force B to adopt policies which, in combination with A's,  leave A at
its highest attainable indifference  curve.  Note as well  that S lies  to
the Northeast of N, closer to both bliss points A* and B*,  implying that
leadership can make both countries better off than myopic adjustment.
Finally, the  locus of cooperative equilibria stretches  from A* to B*
along the points of tangency between the  indifference curves  of the  two
countries.  If the  "bliss points" A* and B* are given a numerical value
and the indifference curves  surrounding them are thought of as  declining
contours,  it  is possible to  imagine the points  (4, 3) and (3,  4) as  two
ends of a continuum, linking the diagram to  the coordination problem in
normal  form discussed above.  Which point on the continuum will be chosen
will depend on the relative bargaining strength of the countries,  among
other factors  (see Snidal,  1985).
However, the achievement  of points along the  cooperative continuum,
requires more than the myopia of Nash and Stackelberg behavior.  Solving
this problem of strategy requires  a form of commitment,  in which Country A
commits  to  a cooperative  solution conditional on its expectation that
Country B will do likewise. As Johnson, Hemmi and Lardinois note  in a
recent study for the Trilateral  Commission:
Although there  are good economic arguments  for greater market
orientation even with other countries standing  still, the
chances  of significantly reducing the degree of protection
provided agriculture are  far better with all trilateral areas16
moving together.  The fear that lowering protection unilaterally
would result in a flood of  imports with little  or no prospect of
offsetting advantages  in international markets makes  greater
market orientation most unlikely unless  carried out in concert
with other major importers  and exporters of farm products
(Johnson and Hemmi, 1985, p. 45,  quoted in Paarlberg, 1987).
This conditional  commitment can be rationally self-interested where
reinforced by strengthened rules of  international trade.  To provide  a
formal basis  for  this reciprocal obligation, the next section considers
the  role of GATT as  a solution to the  assurance problem.
4.  Reciprocal Obligation and the Assurance Problem
The  theory of reciprocity (Sugden, 1984) argues  that agents  can
supply themselves with public goods  through conditional commitments.  Such
commitments do not stipulate that a group member always  contributes  to a
public good.  They say only that  if others  in a well-defined group are
contributing, then a group member is  obliged to  do the  same.  Well-
defined obligations  exist to a group  to which one belongs and from which
one derives benefits.  These groups may be local, national, or
international, including signatories of international trade  agreements.
Individual countries signing the GATT treaty, for example, have well
defined obligations to maintain an open international trading system.
Let  the welfare Wi of each GATT signatory i be an increasing function
of the gains  from international trade measured by z.  This trade  creation
constitutes  a public good.  Country welfare is a decreasing function of
the resources  (political and economic) necessary to overcome domestic
efforts  at protection, qi,  equivalent to  the domestic  effort contributed
to  maintain an open trading system.  One way of specifying qi  is  the
reduction in net effective protection for country i, in relation to  a pre-
determined base period.  Hence:17
Wi- Wi(qi,  z)  (i  - 1  ....  n)  (1)
If hi(qi,  z) is  the marginal rate of substitution between z and qi then by
definition:
hi(qi, z) - - (6Wi/6qi)/(Wi/z)  (i  - 1  .. n)  (2)
Two  additional restrictions, reasonable for  one good  (gains from
trade) and one bad  (efforts to  reduce protection) are:
6hi(qi, z)/6qi > 0  (i - 1 ....  n)  (3)
and
6hi(qi,  z)/6z > 0  (i  - 1 ....  n)  (4)
World gains  from trade are a function of the resources  devoted to
keeping it  free and open by individual countries.  These are contributions
to the public  good.  The  "production function" for  z is  thus  the weighted
sum of  individual country efforts  to reduce  domestic protection.
n
z - f( Z  ai qi)  (5)
i-l
The function f(.)  is assumed continuous, increasing and concave  (or linear
in the limit).  The parameter oi  (a  positive constant)  is  the  "weight" or
impact on world gains  from trade  of the policies of country i, on the
assumption that equal effort need not be equally productive for  all
countries.  This opens  the possibility of disproportionate  contributions
by certain countries  to an open international trading system.  If the U.S.
were prepared to  concede  its  1955 waiver to  agriculture, for example,  its
impact on total gains  from trade would be disproportionately felt by the
world trading system.  Now define a total contribution function F(-)  for a
given level  of country efforts or contributions q - (qi,  ...  qn)  by a
group G (signatories of GATT) and a given level of total  effort r, such18
that where r >  0,
F (G, r) - f (  Z  cjr +  Z  ok qk)  (6)
jeG  kOG
This says  that for any group  of countries G, and level  of effort r >  0,
F(G,  r) is  the gain from trade that would result if every signatory of
GATT had contributed to  open trade by a lower level of protection r and
each non-member k had contributed qk.  (This function must be continuous,
increasing and concave in r.)  For the GATT signatories,  given the
contributions of non-signatories qk, let qiG be the value of r that
maximizes Wi[r, F(G, r)].
Put more  directly, if each country i could choose a lowered level of
protection for all GATT signatories, this  is  the  level  it would choose.
The principle of reciprocity says that GATT signatory i is obligated to
contribute  qiG,  conditional on every other member of G doing the  same.6
If countries  pursue self-interest subject to  these obligations,  then
country i will make the smallest contribution to  reduced levels  of
protection that  is compatible with its  obligations to  all  groups of which
it  is a member, including the  group G - (i).  Hence, purely domestic  self-
interest is  allowed expression, since every country has  an obligation to
itself to contribute  at least as much (or as  little)  protection as  self-
interest requires.
6The following formal definitions may be stated  (Sugden, 1984, p.
777).
Obligations.  For any vector of contributions q, for any group G, and
for any group member i, i is meeting its  obligation to G if and only
if either  (a)  qi > qiG or  (b)  for some  other agent j in G, qi 2 qj.
Equilibrium.  An equilibrium is a vector of contributions q such that
for each country i, given the contributions  of other countries,  qi  is
the smallest contribution that  is  compatible with all of  i's
obligations.19
The essential features of this model are  that (a) equilibrium exists;
(b) it  is  not necessarily unique;  (c)  one equilibrium is Pareto-Optimal--
the  Samuelsonian one  in which the marginal rate of substitution between qi
and z is  equal  to  the marginal rate  of transformation;  (d)  every other
equilibrium involves undersupply of the public good (Sugden, 1984).7
Pareto-inefficient equilibria  involving undersupply of the public good are
due in the case of GATT  to excessive  levels of protection by the
signatories.
If insufficient effort is  expended to  reduce these  levels,  the theory
outlined here suggests the  assurance problem as  an important explanation.
Inefficient equilibria are ones  in which every country would reduce  its
level of protection if only they were assured that others would do  so  too
(Sen, 1967;  Runge, 1984).8  This does not suggest  that the problem of
protectionism will be  solved--only that it  can be solved.  In theory, even
in a world of identical countries, reciprocal obligations  can break down
in the  face  of the  assurance problem.  This breakdown is  even more likely
where the  countries have widely varying objectives  (Sugden, 1984,  p. 783).
Despite these obstacles, we maintain that the  reciprocal obligations
defined by GATT can be an important basis  for more open international
trade.  One of the  important predictions generated by the theory is  that
if country j's level  of protection is  the same  as country  i's,  an increase
in j's will be likely to bring about an  increase in i's,  and vice versa.
7Sugden proves these results  for  the case of homogeneous agents.
Where agents  are heterogeneous, the results  are qualitatively the  same,
but the assurance problem  is  exacerbated.
8If the problem were a prisoners'  dilemma, then no  country would
reduce its  level  of protection, even if  every other country did.
Protectionism would be a dominant strategy.20
If the United States, with a comparatively large influence  (ai) over GATT,
reduces  its  level of protection by conceding its exceptional  treatment and
reducing its  level of domestic  subsidies, then the incentive  of others  to
take similar actions will increase  (Paarlberg, 1987).  However, the
overall success  of policy coordination will depend on the  assurance that
the  effort is general,  and that some countries will not simply free  ride
by continuing to maintain high levels  of protection.  An important aspect
of this  assurance will be the  "transparency" of domestic agricultural
subsidies, allowing efforts  at reducing protectionism to be clearly
determined as  "subsidy equivalents".
More generally, we conjecture  that a critical mass  of countries may
be necessary to overcome the assurance problem.  Schelling  (1973) has
proposed a framework in which the willingness of country i to  contribute
is  described as  a function of the number of others  that are expected to do
so.  Figure 2 shows payoff curves  to country i from contributing to  the
reduction of trade barriers  (C)  versus a protectionist trade strategy  (P).
The payoff Wi to country i is a function of the number of other countries
that are expected to contribute.  Where the P function lies above the C
function, protection is a dominant strategy.  This  is  the  case until y, at
which point a "critical mass" makes  the reduction of trade barriers  a
dominant strategy.  It  is precisely the  function of multilateral trade
negotiations (MTN's) such as  the upcoming GATT round to generate  such a
critical mass by negotiating agreements in which each country is assured
that a sufficiently large number of others will engage in coordinated
trade reforms.
An important feature of MTN's  is  the degree to which they prompt21
optimism that other countries will in fact cooperate  to  reduce trade
barriers.  While beyond the  scope of this paper,  "pessimism" over whether
other countries will reduce protectionism is  one measure  of assurance.
Hurwicz  (1951) has proposed an index of pessimism, such that the
likelihood of a given country choosing a protectionist strategy is  a
direct function of a "pessimism-optimism index". 9
9If each country follows  the pessimism-optimism index of Hurwicz
(1951),  there exists  a critical pair of values  (a,  b) representing the
indices of Country A and B respectively, and contained in the open
interval  (0, 1),  such that  if either country actually has an index above
this value  (is  "too pessimistic") then the outcome will be Pareto-
inferior.  If both countries have greater  than critical pessimism, then
the  outcome will be a Pareto-inferior equilibrium point, equivalent to
Sugden's underprovision equilibrium.
Let the  index of pessimism of A and B be PA and PB respectively, and
the  strategies be 0 and 1 for CA and CB,  as  in the modified assurance
problem (Footnote 5) in which (1, 1) is  the agreed best outcome,  such as
multilateral reductions  in agricultural protection.  Then Country A will
choose protectionist strategy 0 if:
PACA  (0, 1) + (1 - PA) CA (0,  0) > PACA (1,  0) + (1 - PA) CA (1, 1)
i.e.,  if
PA >  [CA  (1, 1) - CA  (0, 0)]/[CA  (0, 1) + CA  (1, 1) - CA  (0, 0)  -CA (1, 0)
a
Similarly, Country B will choose  0 if
PB >  [CB  (1, 1) - CB  (0,  O)]/[CB  (1, 0) + CB  (1, 1) - CB  (0, 0)
- cB (0, 1)]  - b
If CA (1, 1) > CA  (0,  0) and CA  (0, 1) > CA  (1,  O) (see Footnote  5),  then
0 < a < 1, and 0 < b < 1.  If pA > a, or pB > b, the outcome will be other
than (1, 1),  the unique Pareto-optimum.  If both hold, the choice will be
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er of  other contributing countries23
Thusfar, we have argued that a structure of reciprocal obligations,
encoded in international trading rules  such as  GATT, provides  a basis for
the  coordination of trade and reduction of protectionism in world
agriculture.  The principal reason these rules  fail  is  the  assurance
problem, which is  exacerbated by the heterogeneity of interests  and lack
of enforcement typical of international public goods.  Despite these
difficulties,  such rules  are  capable of improving the welfare of all  those
who subscribe  to  them, especially if a critical  mass of others  is expected
to  do  so.  However, the judgements  leading to  this  assurance involve
"repeated plays",  as nations formulate and reformulate  their trade
strategies.  In order to capture  this aspect of trade negotiation, a final
level of analysis is  now developed, expressed in the  framework of a
dynamic game.
5.  Trade Policy as  a Dynamic Game
International trade policy is  formulated on  the basis  of a set of
expectations  that each nation holds regarding  the strategies of other
nations, based on a process that  is played out over time.  Viewing
negotiated reductions  in agricultural protectionism as  a dynamic problem
leads  to a deeper recognition of the role of international institutions  in
establishing secure expectations  concerning the behavior of other trading
nations.  Karp and McCalla (1983),  in an early application of dynamic game
theory to  agricultural trade,  argue that
"Where an agent is  in a position to exercise power,  it  is
unreasonable to suppose  that he  is  either ignorant of  this fact
or acts as  if he were.  It  is  equally unlikely that he will make
the mistake of assuming that he  is  free to  act without inviting
reprisals.  This kind of world involves power, reaction
functions, strategies, and feedback and is  inherently dynamic"
(Karp and McCalla, 1983, p. 641).24
In addition to a structure of reciprocal obligation,  a basic purpose
of GATT rules  is  to define those  forms of protectionism that are valid
(e.g.,  tariffs)  and to  fix, over the relevant future, the  levels of
protection which each nation may employ.  By "binding"  these  levels of
protection, it  is possible for GATT signatories  to be assured that  the
policies  of other nations will not suddenly be  changed once a commitment
to  lowered protection has been made.  In a dynamic context, solving the
assurance problem requires such rules,  for  in their  absence, a decision to
lower protection can simply victimize the country that does  so.
This problem is known formally as  the  "time  inconsistency of optimal
plans"  (Kydland and Prescott,  1977).  It  is  illustrated by the  case of
"zero-binding" tariffs on U.S.  soybean and livestock feed exports to  the
European Community.  During 1961-62,  the  "Dillon Round" of trade
negotiations provided for  the largest concession ever granted to  the U.S.
in GATT.  In granting zero duties  to  soybeans, vegetable  oils, and
nongrain feed items such as  corn gluten feed, the U.S. bound GATT
signatories, including the countries of the emerging European Community
(EC),  to a policy which allowed access  to  the  large European market for
American feed products.  The EC was not then in a position to  supply their
feed demands from domestic production.  Over time, however, as  European
production of livestock feed grew, it became increasingly obvious  to  EC
producers that they could capture  this market by changing the  rules  and
erecting protectionist barriers  to  these U.S.  imports.  Under Article
XXVIII  of the GATT Treaty, however, once the  "binding" had been given, it
could not be reneged without acceptable compensation, and retaliation is
explicitly  allowed if no  such compensation is forthcoming.  When livestock25
feed interests within the EC,  in subsequent attempts  to  "complete the
Common Agricultural Policy," have argued in favor of closing the European
market  to U.S.  soybeans and corn gluten feed, they have been deterred
largely due to  the GATT binding  (Paarlberg, 1987).
More formally, consider  the case  in which a "dominant player",  (such
as  the  EC)  commits  itself to a particular policy, such  as  the zero duty
binding provisions of 1961-62.  Let the  objective function of Country A,
the dominant player, be  defined over the  "bliss point"  A* in Figure  1,
such that  the optimal policy  is  to minimize deviations  from A*.  In a
dominant player game,  the  leader minimizes deviations  from the objective
A*, taking into account the existing conditions affecting trade and the
other players' decision rules.  Given an initial state,  the dominant player,
exercising Stackelberg leadership, solves  the following 2-period problem:
2
min  WA  Z  (Yt - A*t)  '  KAt  (Yt - A*t)  (7)
(XAl, XA2)  t-l
Subject to  (in the open loop  case):
Yt - byO +  HAXAt + HBXBt  (8)
XB1 - rBl  (Yo,  XA1, XA2)
XB2 - rB2  (Yo, XAl, XA2)
Yo  given
or
Subject to  (in the  feedback case):
Yt ' byt-l + HAXAt + HBXBt  (9)
XB1 - VB  (Yt-l, XA1)
XB2 - VB2  (Yt-l, XA2)
Yo given26
WA expresses  the sum of deviations  for Country A from its bliss
points, A*t,  in the  two periods (t - 1, 2).  It seeks  to minimize these
deviations through policies  (decision rules) XAl and XA2,  one  for each of
two periods, given a vector of state variables Yt.  KAt is  a given
(symmetric positive semi-definite) matrix of coefficients reflecting the
effect of the current state on the objective function value.  HA,  Hb,  and
b are vectors  of coefficients  (Chow, 1983).  XB1 and XB2  are  the policies
(decision rules)  of Country B in periods one and two.  In the  open loop
case, Country B's policies are a function of the  initial state, yo,  and
the policies of Country A in both periods.  In the feedback case Country
B's policies are a function of  the current state and Country A's policy in
that period.
The difference between the open loop and feedback cases  is  the nature
of the constraints.  In an "open loop" solution, the dominant player
announces policies that are intended to hold for the relevant future  (here
two  periods) as  functions of the  initial state.  However,  an "open loop"
structure  creates incentives to renege  on this policy in subsequent
periods.  In a "feedback" solution, policies are pursued that are optimal
given the  initial  state, and "rolling plans" are formulated at each point
in time to  reflect the conditions of the  (then) current state.  The key
distinction between feedback and open loop solutions  is  that  the  dominant
player's  decisions  in  the case of feedback are time consistent because
there  is  no  incentive to  renege.  The incentive to renege makes the  open
loop  solution time-inconsistent.10
10Time inconsistency also arises  in "closed loop"  dominant player
games.  Closed loop decision rules are functions of the  current state as
are feedback rules but give very different answers  in general.  The27
Which solution is used is  of critical importance.  The feedback
solution is  inferior to  the open loop solution because the  dominant
country does  not take  into account in period 2 the influence XA2 has  on
XB1.  The feedback solution is,  however, time  consistent while  the open
loop  solution is not.  In fact,  any systematic relationship between
expected and actual future decisions can cause time  inconsistency.  Time
inconsistency arises when the  original decision rules  for XA1 and XA2 are
no  longer optimal if Country A resolves  the problem in period 2.  If
Country A  is  continually tempted to renege  on its level  of protection then
the game may fall  into disorder as  early as  the  first period  (Kydland,
1977).
If, as Karp  (1982) argues, GATT negotiations are akin to open loop 
solution strategies,  the need for assurance provided by GATT rules  is of
paramount importance due  to  the  incentive to renege.  Kyland and Prescott
(1977) have argued that whenever such time  inconsistency arises,  policy
rules  such as  the GATT binding are superior to  the use of  "discretion".
If GATT is  in fact an "open loop" dynamic game,  one  of the dangers  of new
rounds  of negotiations is  the temptation  to renege on earlier agreements
that appear suboptimal  to groups  such as  the  EC  in light of changed market
conditions.  If EC interests are successful in "completing the CAP" by
countermanding the zero-duty binding, for  example, they will further
feedback decision rules  are obtained by a dynamic programming algorithm.
In the open loop solution Country A's decision rules are of the  form:
XAt - Z*At  (Yo)  (t  - 1, 2)
Where z* is an equilibrium solution to  Country A's policy problem.
Country A "announces" both XA1 and XA2  to Country B at  the beginning of
the  game.  In the feedback solution decision rules  are of the  form:
XAt - C*At  (Yt-l)  (t - 1, 2)
where C* is again an equilibrium solution to  Country A's policy problem.
Country A announces XA1 in the first period and XA2  in the second.28
reduce the  level  of free  trade in agriculture.  While narrowly self-
interested, this  loss  in trade will be borne by all  trading nations  as  the
cost of granting such discretion rather than holding to  GATT rules.  In
this  light, it  is  clear that the GATT rules provide assurance of continued
benefits  in a dynamic framework.
6.  Conclusions
In the years since the GATT treaty was signed, agriculture has been
transformed.  Increasing integration of world markets, accompanied by
shifting patterns of production and substantial  instability in both supply
and demand, have led to  disequilibrium in world agriculture.  Domestic
efforts  to protect agricultural  sectors from this  instability have raised
barriers to  trade,  leading agriculture to be regarded as  increasingly out
of step with trade liberalization in other sectors.  The Uruguay Round of
trade negotiations offers an opportunity  for institutional innovations
that can bring greater freedom to world markets, reducing the
international and domestic  costs of protectionism in agriculture.
However,  it is highly unlikely that this  liberalization will be  achieved
through hegenomic authority or international  institutions  alone, neither
of which is sufficient  to provide the  impetus  for reform.
The  reasoning of this paper may be summarized as  five key points.
First, gains  from more open agricultural  trade are  in large part public
goods.  Benefits are distributed and costs are concentrated on non-
competitive  sectors, leading to  incentive problems which pose fundamental
challenges  to  trade negotiators.  These challenges can be faced only by
acknowledging the difficult domestic reforms necessary for more  open
trade, and the considerable political and economic effort that must be29
expended to  overcome interest groups  threatened by the process of
liberalization.
Second, the position of the U.S.  in the GATT  is based on the 1955
waiver and a variety of general exclusions  granted to  agriculture.  These
reflect an earlier influence which has  faded with U.S. hegemony in world
markets.  However, the U.S.  remains disproportionately influencial  as  a
source  of trade policy reform, in part because the  "marginal productivity"
of removing the 1955 waiver is  large.  Nonetheless, unilateral trade
policy reform  is  far  less  likely to  succeed than coordinated efforts
inside  (and outside) of GATT.
Third, the need for coordination arises  from the reciprocal
obligations encoded in the GATT treaty itself.  The theory of reciprocity
outlined above emphasizes that such rules  of obligation can provide  the
basis for trade  liberalization,  if  the assurance exists  that the effort
with be jointly pursued by all members of the GATT.  It predicts  that the
lower the  level  of support for domestic trade  liberalization that is
signaled by the U.S.,  the less  likely other countries are  to pursue
similar strategies.  A critical mass of countries favoring such
liberalization, perhaps  in the  form of the U.S. and the  "Cairns Group",
would appear to be necessary to  overcome this assurance problem.  Even so,
the heterogeneity of country interests will make  the process exceedingly
difficult.
Fourth, the problem of clearly establishing obligations under GATT
suggests the importance of "transparent" measures of effort, such as
"subsidy equivalents".  Without  these measures,  it will be  difficult to
determine whether obligations defined under GATT rules  are in  fact being30
observed.  Recent work in this  area by OECD and the U.S. Department of
Agriculture represent a promising beginning.
Fifth, the  "binding"  character of GATT rules provides a vital degree
of assurance in the face  of dynamic changes  in world market conditions
which would otherwise lead nations to renege  on earlier agreements.  This
"time-inconsistency" underscores  the  instability and backsliding which
would characterize world trade  in the  absence of GATT  rules.
If the analytical description we have offered is  accurate, it
suggests that clear gains are possible from policy coordination in world
agriculture.  These gains can be achieved in principle.  Whether  they will
be achieved in practice is a question of the  skill and resolve of the GATT
participants.31
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